The performance analysis of the 27th Division is illustrative of all divisions which were mobilized in 1940-41 from the National Guard. The focus was on personnel, training, organization, military education of the leadership, and external influences. As was the case with all National Guard divisions, the Congress denied adequate funds to equip or train them to a standard which would enable them to function in war. Once mobilization began the Army systematically disintegrated the National Guard divisions sending its soldiers to service schools and to other newly activated divisions. The Army's theory that all soldiers were but interchangeable parts that could be inserted anywhere disregarded the major potential contribution of the National Guard. This contribution was the cohesion developed through years of close association. The senior leadership of the National Guard was a particular weakness in both tactical and technical matters and leadership. The upshot of the study is that the post-mobilization Army failed to capitalize on the strengths of the National Guard, its cohesion, while permitting its gravest vulnerability, the ineptitude of the senior leadership. Keywords: Military reserves, Leadership, Infantry; Division level organizations; Morale/history; Military training; Pacific Ocean Islands; Theses.

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